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APPORTIONMENT OF DAMGES FOR CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: A
FIXED OR DISCRETIONARY APPROACH?
James Goudkamp*
In most of the common law world, legislation provides for damages
to be apportioned where the claimant is guilty of contributory
negligence. This legislation imposes a system of what will be called
‘discretionary apportionment’. It gives judges considerable latitude to
determine the extent to which damages should be diminished for
contributory negligence. This article draws attention to the fact that
many, varied departures from this system of discretionary
apportionment have infiltrated the law. This article classifies these
departures (which will be called ‘fixed apportionment rules’),
emphasises that they conflict with the apportionment legislation and
considers how the conflicts ought to be resolved. An important
conclusion reached is that the landmark decision in Froom v Butcher
was decided per incuriam. This is because it laid down fixed
apportionment rules, and such rules conflict with the apportionment
legislation. Attention is then turned to the arguments for and against a
discretionary system of apportionment and a system that incorporates
more fixed apportionment rules. It contends that much stands to be
gained from introducing more fixed apportionment rules.
1.

Introduction

The defence of contributory negligence is one of the most important parts of the law of torts. 1
Few other rules are in issue in tort litigation with such regularity. It is undoubtedly the queen
of the defences known to tort law in terms of its practical impact. For one reason or another,
however, it has attracted little scholarly interest, and certainly much less than it deserves.
Given this lack of academic attention, it is perhaps unsurprising that some striking features of
the law that governs the defence have gone essentially unnoticed. This article begins by
noting two such features. The first feature is that the rules that control the defence have in
many jurisdictions remained essentially frozen following the passage of apportionment
legislation. In Britain, the relevant law has hardly changed at all since the Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 was enacted.2 Parliament has scarcely touched this Act
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Fellow, Keble College, Oxford; Associate Professor, Oxford Law Faculty. I am grateful to John Murphy,
Donal Nolan and Prince Saprai for their helpful comments on early drafts of this article. I am also indebted
to participants in the University of Sydney Forum on Apportionment and the Attribution of Liability
(especially to Peter Cane), the Moral Values and Private Law III workshop at King’s College London
(particularly to Andrew Dyson, John Goldberg, Ajay Ratan, Victor Tadros and Benjamin Zipursky) and the
tort strand of the Society of Legal Scholars’ Annual Conference 2014 (especially to Jenny Steele and
Stephen Todd). I am grateful to Ellen Bublick for reviewing my use of US sources and also to Eleanor
Mitchell for her research assistance.
‘“Contributory negligence” … is raised very frequently, and has a great impact on the operation of the law’:
Tony Weir, An Introduction to Tort Law (2nd ed, 2006) 123; ‘Contributory negligence is a core element in
tort law in England (and other common law countries)’: WVH Rogers, ‘Contributory Negligence under
English Law’ in U Magnus and M Martín-Casals (eds), Unification of Tort Law: Contributory Negligence
(2004) 57, 57.
Most of the Act extends to Scotland. It does not extend to Northern Ireland, which has its own legislation:
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (Northern Ireland) 1948.
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since passing it,3 and the courts have made relatively few (and certainly no radical) changes
to the law in this area. Generally speaking, the description of the law regarding contributory
negligence offered by Glanville Williams in 1951 in his magisterial treatise Joint Torts and
Contributory Negligence4 is as accurate today as when it was written.5 The law in Canada has
similarly remained largely stationary since the introduction of apportionment legislation,
which occurred in most of Canada during the 1920s and 1930s. The situation in Australia has
been more fluid. Several Australian legislatures have enacted statutes that, among other
things, erect presumptions of contributory negligence where the claimant engages in specified
behaviour6 and compel the courts to reduce damages by a minimum7 or fixed percentage8 in
certain situations. However, these changes to the defence of contributory negligence in
Australia are hardly revolutionary. In summary, since the coming of apportionment, the law
governing the defence of contributory negligence has generally been extremely stable
throughout the common-law world.
The second striking feature of the law regarding the defence of contributory negligence
that has passed largely unnoticed is that inter-jurisdictional differences in the law between
common law systems are minimal. For example, the core rules that govern the defence in
Australia, Britain and Canada are essentially identical. These rules, stated very simply, are as
follows: (1) a claimant is guilty of contributory negligence if he fails to take reasonable care
of his own safety and that failure is causally related to his damage; 9 (2) if the claimant is
guilty of contributory negligence, his action will not be defeated on account of that
contributory negligence, but his damages must be reduced;10 and (3) the reduction must be
‘just and equitable’ and this is determined by having regard to the relative blameworthiness
of the parties and the causal potency of their acts.11 The situation in the United States disrupts
this harmonious picture. Some jurisdictions in the United States embrace ‘pure comparative
responsibility’ regimes, which consist of rules that are materially identical to those that have
just been described. However, a majority of jurisdictions have ‘modified comparative
responsibility’ systems, in which contributory negligence by the claimant is fatal to his action

3

4

5

6

7
8
9

10

11

Tweaks were made to the Act by the National Insurance (Industries Injuries) Act 1946, the Carriage by Air
Act 1961, the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, the Consumer
Protection Act 1987 and the Environmental Protection Act 1990.
Glanville L Williams, Joints Torts and Contributory Negligence: A Study of Concurrent Fault in Great
Britain, Ireland and the Common-Law Dominions (London, Stevens & Sons, 1951).
‘Glanville Williams[’s] ... text on contributory negligence ... remains, arguably, the best analysis available
today’ of the law in this area: Chae v Min [2001] ABQB 1071, [14]; ‘Although now over 50 years old,
G. Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (1950) is still the leading treatment’: Rogers (n 1) 57,
fn 1.
See, e.g., Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 138(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW),
s 50(3).
See the text accompanying nn 72–76.
See the text accompanying nn 65–66, 71.
‘In order to establish the defence of contributory negligence, the defendant must prove, first, that the plaintiff
failed to take “ordinary care for himself,” or, in other words, such care as a reasonable man would take for
his own safety, and secondly, that his failure to take care was a contributory cause of the accident”: Lewis v
Denye [1939] 1 KB 540 (CA) 554 (Du Parcq LJ).
If the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence, the courts have no discretion not to reduce damages:
Boothman v British Northrop Ltd [1972] 13 KIR 112 (CA) 121–122; Bagder v Ministry of Defence [2005]
EWHC 2941 (QB); [2006] 3 All ER 173, [15].
Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953] AC 663 (HL) 682; Podredersek v Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd
(1985) 59 ALJR 492 (HCA) 494. The position in Canada might be different in this connection. Consider
Cempel v Harrison Hot Springs Hotel Ltd (1997) 43 BCLR (3d) 219, [19] where it is opined that the parties’
fault only should be compared. See also Heller v Martens [2002] ABCA 122; (2002) 4 Alta LR (4 th) 51.
2

if his share of the responsibility for his damage reaches a certain level (usually 51%).12
Accordingly, rule (2), above, is not fully implemented in the United States. However,
notwithstanding the diversity of approaches in the United States, it is generally true to say
that, in most of the common-law world, there is a high degree of uniformity in the law
regarding contributory negligence.
These two features of the law governing the defence of contributory negligence – minimal
evolution in the law subsequent to the introduction of apportionment legislation and a high
degree of uniformity among common law jurisdictions – might be thought to suggest that
there is widespread satisfaction with law in this connection. This perception is arguably
reinforced by the fact that, in most of the common-law world, academic engagement with the
defence is virtually non-existent. This is particularly true in Australia, Canada and the United
Kingdom, where descriptions of the defence offered by textbooks writers are uniformly bland
and prosaic13 and the defence is usually mentioned only in passing in academic journals.14
Difficult questions are simply not being asked in relation to it. This article tackles one such
question: to what extent should the apportionment of damages for contributory negligence be
left to judicial discretion? In other words, should judges have essentially free rein to
determine the appropriate discount or should what will be called ‘fixed apportionment’ rules
which stipulate the discount to be applied ex-ante be adopted? This question appears not to
have been previously considered, at least not directly. Certainly, no mention of it is made of it
by Glanville Williams in his work on contributory negligence, 15 which remains the most
comprehensive treatment of the subject by far.
This article unfolds as follows. Section 2 explains what the concepts of discretionary
apportionment and fixed apportionment entail. In Section 3, it is noted that the British
apportionment provision (which has served as a model in many other jurisdictions), embraces
discretionary apportionment. Section 4 notes that, despite the acceptance of discretionary
apportionment, many fixed apportionment rules have infiltrated the law in all of the major
common law jurisdictions. Section 5 stresses the incompatibility of discretionary
apportionment rules and fixed apportionment rules and Section 6 discusses how conflicts
between such rules should be resolved. Section 7 examines the case for and against
discretionary and fixed apportionment and concludes that it would be better if the law was
tilted more in favour of fixed apportionment than it is at present. Section 8 considers how,
precisely, the law should be shifted more in the direction of fixed apportionment. Section 9
addresses some possible objections to the recommendations made in Section 8. Section 10
addresses some implications of the analysis in relation to the law concerning contribution.
The main conclusions are summarised in Section 11.
2.

The Concepts Distinguished

In a legal system that provides for damages to be apportioned for contributory negligence, a
distinction can be drawn between two general approaches to apportioning damages based on
how free judges are to determine the appropriate discount in damages. These approaches to
apportionment will be called ‘discretionary apportionment’ and ‘fixed apportionment’. Under
12
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Regarding the jurisdictions that accept pure and modified comparative responsibility, and the small number
of jurisdictions that withhold apportionment altogether, see Restatement (Third) Torts: Apportionment of
Liability §7 cmt a.
In 1974 one writer justifiably complained that ‘In England most standard textbooks have little or nothing to
say’ about contributory negligence: JC Hicks, ‘Seat Belts and Crash Helmets’ (1974) 37 MLR 308, 313.
This complaint remains valid today.
For rare exceptions see Glanville Williams, ‘The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945’ (1946) 9
MLR 105; Nigel Gravells, ‘Three Heads of Contributory Negligence’ (1977) 93 LQR 581.
Williams (n 4).
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discretionary apportionment, judges enjoy essentially absolute freedom to decide the discount
in view of the salient features of the case before them. They can have regard to whatever facts
that they feel are important. In a system of discretionary apportionment, a given act of
contributory negligence might attract a particular discount in one case and a rather different
discount in another. This possibility exists because, as has been noted, trial judges have
essentially free rein to determine the amount by which the damages should be discounted in
the light of the circumstances of the case. Different judges will naturally reach different
conclusions concerning the size of the discount that is appropriate.
By contrast, fixed apportionment entails apportioning damages in some ex-ante way.
Judicial freedom to determine the discount for contributory negligence is restricted. Under a
fixed apportionment regime, categories of case are identified and cases that fall within a
given category are handled in the same fashion, at least to a certain degree. Thus, fixed
apportionment can result in cases that fall within a given category being handled in a like way
irrespective of the fact that two cases that fall within the category concerned might be rather
dissimilar. The most obvious way of isolating a category to which a fixed apportionment rule
may be applied is by reference to particular acts of contributory negligence, such as failing to
wear a seat belt or use a safety-helmet.
The distinction between discretionary apportionment and fixed apportionment should not
be overstated. The difference between these concepts is not as stark as it may initially seem.
For one thing, under a system of discretionary apportionment, judges do not have total
freedom to impose a given discount, hence why it was stated in the first paragraph of this
section that the freedom enjoyed by judges in a discretionary apportionment regime is only
essentially absolute. The freedom given to judges in a discretionary apportionment system
can plainly never be total because judges, by virtue of their office, are subject to certain
constraints.16 Judges must act judicially, and this includes an obligation to produce outcomes
that are at least roughly consistent with other cases which factually similar. In other words,
judges, in a system of discretionary apportionment, cannot ‘indulge fancy or mere whim’.17
They cannot pluck figures out of the air.
A second reason why the contrast between discretionary apportionment and fixed
apportionment is less extreme than it might at first glance appear is that, under a fixed
apportionment system, judges will still enjoy some discretion. They will, at the very least,
have discretion to decide whether the instant case is one to which a fixed apportionment rule
applies. For example, if a statute provides that damages must be reduced by, say, 50%, if the
claimant was injured while relying on an intoxicated defendant,18 the judge will have some
leeway to decide what the words ‘relying’ and ‘intoxicated’ mean (unless he is constrained by
a prior interpretation of those words by a court the decision of which he is bound) and
whether the words are applicable to the facts of the case given the meanings that he ascribes
to them.
A third and final reason why the gulf between discretionary apportionment and fixed
apportionment is not as vast as one might initially think is because they represent poles on a
spectrum rather than digital choice. A legislature, for example, might provide for a fixed
apportionment rule (say, a provision that stipulates that a given act of contributory negligence
will attract a fixed discount of 25%), but incorporate a safety valve that allows judges to
16

17
18

As HLA Hart observed in his ‘lost’ essay on discretion (HLA Hart, ‘Discretion’ (2013) 127 Harvard Law
Review 652 at 657): ‘When we are considering the use of discretion in the Law we are considering its use by
officials who are holding a responsible public office. It is therefore understood that if what officials are to do
is not rigidly determined by specific rules but a choice is left to them, they will choose responsibly having
regard to their office and not indulge in fancy or mere whim…’.
ibid, 657.
See, e.g., the Australian statutes mentioned in nn 71, 74.
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depart from the rule if they consider that applying it would produce injustice or if the case is
exceptional. Such a rule would lie somewhere near the middle of the postulated spectrum.
The same would be true of a rule that limited the permissible reductions in damages to a
reduction falling within a particular range, say, between 25% and 75%.
Despite these three reasons for concluding that the contrast between discretionary
apportionment and fixed apportionment is not black and white, it plainly remains possible to
draw at least a rough line between, on the one hand, a system of discretionary apportionment
and, on the other hand, a system of fixed apportionment. A legal system can be identified, at
least in a rough and ready way as accepting either discretionary apportionment or fixed
apportionment. This article proceeds on the basis of this understanding.
3.

The Embrace of Discretionary Apportionment

The British apportionment provision is contained in section 1 of the Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. This provision, which has been widely replicated
elsewhere,19 relevantly states that where the claimant is guilty of contributory negligence the
‘damages recoverable … shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable
having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage’. This provision
plainly opts for a system of discretionary apportionment.20 It does not, for example, specify
ex-ante reductions in damages that are to be applied to certain types of cases. Furthermore,
the words ‘just and equitable’ give the courts significant leeway to determine the appropriate
apportionment.21 They afford the judge the opportunity to look at all of the circumstances of
the case at hand. Consistently with the fact that the provision opts for discretionary
apportionment, it has often stressed that it requires each case to be decided on its own facts22
and that appellate courts will rarely disturb a trial judge’s determination as to the appropriate
reduction in damages.23
While the British apportionment provision clearly gives trial judges great freedom, so that
it can properly be said to opt for a system of discretionary apportionment, it fetters the
discretion that it affords in at least two ways. First, the discretion must be exercised having
regard to ‘the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage’.24 This excludes certain
facts from consideration. For example, it would be wrong, given this statutory language, for
the court to take into account in determining the appropriate discount the fact that the
claimant risked the defendant’s safety or the safety of third parties. Such facts do not relate to
the claimant’s responsibility for the damage, which means, of course, the damage suffered by
19

20
21

22

23

24

See, e.g., Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 9; Contributory Negligence Act 1947
(NZ), s 3.
It is a classic example of what Hart called ‘expressed or avowed use of discretion’: Hart (n 16) 655–656.
‘It is clear that the Act intends to give a very wide discretion to the judge or jury entrusted with the … task
of making the apportionment. Much latitude must be allowed to the … tribunal in arriving at a judgment as
to what is just and equitable’: Pennington v Norris (1956) 96 CLR 10, 15–16 (HCA). See also Stanton v
Collinson [2010] EWCA Civ 81; [2010] RTR 26, [26]. However, in Smith v Chief Constable of
Nottinghamshire Police [2012] EWCA Civ 161; [2012] RTR 23, [36] the court seemed to doubt whether the
apportionment legislation affords trial judges an ‘unfettered discretion’.
‘The significance of the various elements involved in [the determination of the appropriate apportionment]
will vary from cars to case’: Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1885) 59 ALJR 492 (HCA) 494;
‘[T]he degree of contributory negligence depends on the particular circumstances of the individual case’:
Finlayson v Lanarkshire Health Board (1996) Rep LR 119 (OH) …; ‘[I]t is important to remember that
every case depends upon its own facts’: Phethean-Hubble v Coles [2012] EWCA Civ 349; [2012] RTR 31,
[80]; ‘Each case … must be decided on its own facts’: Currie v Clamp’s Executor 2002 SLT 196 (OH) [22].
Phethean-Hubble v Coles [2012] EWCA Civ 349, [86]. Even the approximate frequency with which
appellate courts actually intervene is unknown. No data are available in this connection.
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, s 1(1).
5

the claimant.25 As Glanville Williams put it, ‘fault not contributing to the damage cannot be
taken into account’.26 The fact that the discretion must be exercised having regard to ‘the
claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage’ also means that certain things must be
considered. For example, the court must take into account the defendant’s share in the
responsibility for the damage since, as Hale LJ noted in Eagle v Chambers, ‘[i]t is …
impossible to consider the claimant's “share” without also considering that of the
defendant.’27
A second way in which the apportionment legislation limits the discretion that it affords
judges is on account of the fact that it stipulates that reductions in damages for contributory
negligence must be ‘just and equitable’. The courts have endeavoured to discover what
Parliament intended by these words.28 As mentioned earlier,29 it has been held, at least in
Australia and Britain, that these words require judges to have regard to the parties’ relative
moral blameworthiness and the ‘causative potency’ of their careless conduct. The fact that
judges must take account of these considerations into account (and perhaps only these
considerations30) limits their discretion. Of course, these factors are extremely general and it
has never been explained in any detail what they mean, so their adoption does little to curtail
the discretion that judges enjoy in apportioning damages.
4.

Fixed Apportionment Rules

The British apportionment provision and the apportionment provisions in other
Commonwealth jurisdictions give the impression that discretionary apportionment reigns
supreme. However, the true situation is rather different and significantly more complex.
Jurisdictions that prima facie accept discretionary apportionment as a consequence of their
apportionment legislation often recognise rules that provide for fixed apportionment to a
limited extent. At least three types of fixed apportionment rules can be identified: (1) rules
that provide for fixed reductions in damages; (2) rules that provide for minimum reductions
in damages; (3) rules that place a ceiling on permissible reductions in damages. These rules
will be discussed seriatim. The goal here is, in addition to drawing attention to their
existence, to determine their scope. These are not the only types of fixed apportionment rules
that could exist. There are at least two further types of fixed apportionment rules that could
be created: (4) rules that establish a floor on permissible reductions in damages; and (5) rules
that limit the permissible discount to a particular range of discounts. Although no clear
example of such rules can be found in any Commonwealth jurisdiction, a few words will also
be said about these additional types of fixed apportionment rules.

25
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30

This is clear from the opening words of s 1(1): ‘Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his
own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage…’.
Williams (n 4) 390.
[2003] EWCA Civ 1107; [2004] RTR 9, [14].
See further the text accompanying n 100.
See the sources cited in n 11.
The issue of whether or not these factors are exhaustive of the consideration to which the courts are
permitted to refer does not seem to have ever been addressed in a reported case decided in a Commonwealth
jurisdiction.
6

(a)
(i)

Fixed Reductions in Damages

The Froom Rules

A leading decision regarding the defence of contributory negligence is Froom v Butcher.31
This was a run-of-the-mill seat belt case. The claimant passenger suffered more serious
injuries in an accident that was caused by the defendant driver’s negligence than he would
have suffered had he used a seat belt.32 The trial judge held that the failure to wear a seat belt
did not constitute contributory negligence.33 Lord Denning MR (with whom Lawton and
Scarman LJJ agreed) reversed this holding. In the course of doing so, his Lordship laid down
several rules to determine how damages should be apportioned where the claimant
negligently failed to wear a seat belt.34 He wrote:35
Sometimes the evidence will show that the failure [to wear a seat belt] made no difference. The
damage would have been the same, even if a seat belt had been worn. In such case the damages
should not be reduced at all. At other times the evidence will show that the failure made all the
difference. The damage would have been prevented altogether if a seat belt had been worn. In such
cases I would suggest that the damages should be reduced by 25 per cent. But often enough the
evidence will only show that the failure made a considerable difference. Some injuries to the head,
for instance, would have been a good deal less severe if a seat belt had been worn, but there would
still have been some injury to the head. In such case I would suggest that the damages attributable
to the failure to wear a seat belt should be reduced by 15 per cent.

An often overlooked fact about Froom is that Lord Denning MR did not adhere strictly to
these rules (the Froom rules’) in disposing of the appeal. Since the evidence was that some of
the claimant’s injuries would have been completely avoided had the claimant used a seat belt
while other injuries would have been incurred regardless of whether the claimant had worn a
seat belt,36 Lord Denning MR decided to reduce the damages by 20%. 20% was the figure by
which the trial judge said he would have reduced damages had he found the claimant guilty
of contributory negligence. Possibly also important in Lord Denning MR’s decision to
impose a discount of 20% was the fact that the claimant did not suggest that this discount was
inappropriate.
Lord Denning MR did not change the law in remarking that damages should not be
apportioned if the claimant’s negligent failure to wear a seat belt would not have made any
difference to the damage. Causally irrelevant contributory negligence by the claimant has
never been sufficient to enliven the defence of contributory negligence.37 Such contributory
31

32

33
34

35
36
37

[1976] QB 286 (CA). A perceptive note on Froom is JR Spencer, ‘Belt Up!––The Widening Scope of
Contributory Negligence’ [1976] Cambridge Law Journal 44.
The plaintiff suffered injuries to his head, chest and one of his fingers. The head and chest injuries would
have been avoided if the plaintiff had worn a seat belt. The plaintiff’s finger would have been injured
regardless of whether he had used a seat belt: Froom v Butcher [1976] QB 286 (CA) 296.
Froom v Butcher [1974] 1 WLR 1297 (QBD).
Lord Denning MR also established several rules concerning the circumstances in a plaintiff should be found
guilty of contributory negligence. For instance, his Lordship also laid down the principle that the plaintiff
can be guilty of contributory negligence provided that his carelessness contributes merely to the damage as
opposed to the accident: at 292–293. These other rules created by Lord Denning MR are not presently
relevant and nothing further will be said about them.
[1976] QB 286 (CA) 296.
See n 32.
In Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associate Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152 (HL) 165 Lord Atkin said ‘[i]f the
plaintiff were negligent but his negligence was not a cause operating to produce the damage there would be
7

has always been immaterial, both before and after the enactment of the apportionment
legislation. However, the situation is otherwise with respect to Lord Denning MR’s
suggestion that damages should be reduced by 25% reduction if the damage suffered would
have been completely avoided had the claimant worn a seat belt, and by 15% if the damage
would have been less severe. By these remarks, Lord Denning MR isolated two categories of
case and suggested that cases falling into those categories should be subject to fixed
discounts. In other words, he created fixed reduction rules.
What is the status of the Froom rules? It is arguable that they are merely obiter dicta given
that Lord Denning MR did not apply them. One might also fairly contend that
Lord Denning MR meant only for them to be guidelines (he spoke in permissive language38).
However, this is not how they have been understood by the courts. Judges seem to adhere
strictly to them (although no one has carried out the empirical work that is necessary to
confirm whether this is so). The rules do not, of course, determine the outcome of cases
where a negligent failure to use a seat belt is combined with another act of contributory
negligence (as will often be the case), such a accepting a lift from an intoxicated driver,39
travelling in a car knowing that its brakes were defective,40 or travelling in the boot of a car.41
In such cases, discounts greater than those enunciated in Froom are often applied. However,
where the only act of contributory negligence is a negligent failure to wear a seat belt it
seems that the courts rarely depart from the Froom rules. They have been applied countless
times42 and attempts to modify them have repeatedly been rebuffed.43 The courts have made
it crystal clear that they have little or no appetite for reconsidering them. 44 Indeed, the courts
have extended them to related contexts, such as a failure of motorcyclists 45 and bicyclists46 to
wear crash helmets.47
Of course, despite the foregoing, is difficult to be certain regarding the extent to which the
Froom rules are determinative in practice. This is partly because most of the cases to which
they will have been relevant will have been decided by courts that are situated lower in the
judicial hierarchy than the High Court, and decisions of such courts are rarely reported or
otherwise made publically available. It is also because litigants are also free to reach an
agreement on the issue of apportionment. Litigants are obviously not forced to accept the
Froom rules. There is some evidence that litigants, oddly, sometimes agree to discounts that
differ wildly from those established in Froom even though Froom would clearly apply were
the case litigated.48

38
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no defence. I find it impossible to divorce any theory of contributory negligence from the concept of
causation.’
See the text accompanying n 35.
See, e.g., Sloan v Triplett 1985 SLT 294 (OH) (33.3%); Hill v Chivers 1987 SLT 323 (OH) (33.3%).
See, e.g., Gregory v Kelly [1978] RTR 426 (QBD) (40%).
See, e.g., Gleeson v Court [2007] EWHC 2397 (QB); [2008] RTR 10 (30%).
See, e.g., Patience v Andrew [1983] RTR 447 (QBD); Palmer v Kitley [2008] EWHC 2819 (QB);
Mabiriizi v HSBC Insurance (UK) Ltd [2011] EWHC 12080 (QB), [10].
See, e.g., the unsuccessful attempts made in Gawler v Raettig [2007] EWHC 373 (QB), [39]–[46]; Stanton v
Collinson [2010] EWCA Civ 81; [2010] RTR 284, [26].
This message is made particularly clear in Stanton v Collinson [2010] EWCA Civ 81, [27].
Capps v Miller [1989] 2 All ER 333; [1989] 1 WLR 839 (CA).
Smith v Finch [2009] EWHC 53 (QB).
For discussion, see Julian Fulbrook, ‘Cycle Helmets and Contributory Negligence’ [2004] Journal of
Personal Injury Law 171. The rules were not extended to riding in the boot of a car: Gleeson v Court [2007]
EWHC 2397 (QB); [2008] RTR 10, [25] (30%).
See, e.g., Madden v Quirk [1989] 1 WLR 702 (QBD) (5%); Hitchens v Berkshire Council (unreported, Court
of Appeal of England and Wales, 21 June 2000) (50%); Demetriou v Holdsowrth (unreported, High Court of
England and Wales, 11 May, 2001, WL 949928) (10%).
8

It is true that the Froom rules are not wholly inflexible (recall that they were not applied in
Froom itself49). Judges have a discretion to depart from them. However, the courts have said
firmly and repeatedly that they will be departed from only in ‘rare or exceptional’50 cases. It
has been declared that it ‘is of the greatest importance that they should be generally be kept
to’51 and that they are not ‘mere suggestion or guidance’.52 Only a handful of cases can be
found in which they were not applied where they were prima facie applicable.53 Where the
defendant contends that the discount for contributory negligence should be increased above
25% it seems that only conscious risk taking by the claimant will render a case sufficiently
exceptional to escape from the grip of the Froom rules.54 It seems that there is no reported
case or case the decision in which is electronically available in which this condition has been
satisfied.55
The Froom rules have not been swallowed hook, line and sinker by the courts in any other
jurisdiction.56 However, they are not infrequently referred to by courts in Australia57 and
Canada58 and are plainly influential in those countries. Nevertheless, in both of these
jurisdictions it seems that judges have greater discretion to impose the discount that they
think is warranted. For example, in Snushall v Fulsang Juriansz JA wrote: ‘Canadian courts
generally … have not expressed approval of the three-level framework Lord Denning
suggested.’59 In Heller v Martens, Fruman JA observed: ‘It is obvious that in English seat
belt cases apportionment is based on a fixed qualification that is considerably less
discretionary than a typical Alberta analysis.’60
(ii)

Other Fixed Reduction Rules

No other fixed reduction rules appear to have been developed by the courts in any
jurisdiction. Tugendhat J recently claimed in Best v Smyth that ‘since Owens v Brimmell
[1977] QB 859 the figure of 20% is commonly regarded as an appropriate reduction for a
claimant who has got into a vehicle when he must have known that the driver had had too
much to drink.’61 Although it is true that cases in which the claimant accepted a ride from a
drunken defendant can be found in which a 20% reduction was applied,62 it is doubtful that
49
50
51
52

53

54
55

56

57

58

59
60
61
62

See the text accompanying n 36.
Gawler v Raettig [2007] EWHC 373 (QB), [26]. See also Jones v Wilkins [2001] RTR 19 (CA) [18].
Capps v Miller [1989] 2 All ER 333 (CA) 341; [1989] 1 WLR 839, 849–850 (Croom-Johnson LJ).
Gawler v Raettig [2007] EWHC 373 (QB), [25]; contra Chae v Min [2001] ABQB 1071, [25]
(‘[Lord Denning MR] proposed a mere guideline’) (Veit J).
See, e.g., Roberts v Sparks [1977] CLY 2643 (20%); Capps v Miller [1989] 2 All ER 333; [1989] 1 WLR
839 (CA) (10%); Hazlett v Robinson [2014} NIQB 17 (20%).
Jones v Wilkins [2001] RTR 19 (CA) [19]; Gawler v Raettig [2007] EWHC 373 (QB), [31].
In Jones v Wilkins [2001] RTR 19 (CA) [15] Keene LJ remarked that ‘there has been no reported case of
which counsel are aware where a passenger’s failure to wear a seat belt has resulted in a finding of more than
25 per cent contributory negligence.’
Including Scotland: see, e.g., Smith v Donald McLaren Ltd 1977 SLT (Notes) 51 (OH) (20%); Sloan v
Triplett 1985 SLT 294 (OH) 297 (20%).
See, e.g., Hallowell v The Nominal Defendant (Queensland) [1983] 2 Qd R 266, 268 (Full Ct); Ferrett v
Worsley (1993) 61 SASR 234 (Full Ct) 242; Richard v Mills [2003] WASCA 97, [26].
‘Froom v Butcher … has been widely accepted and approved in Canada and has acquired a settled place in
our jurisprudence’: Fowler v Schneider National Carries Ltd [2001] NSCA 55; (2001) 193 NSR (2d) 206,
[52]; ‘Many Canadian courts have relied on Lord Denning’s 1975 decision in Froom v Butcher’: Chae v Min
[2001] ABQB 1071, [24]; ‘Lord Denning’s judgment in Froom has been cited consistently in Canadian
cases’: Snushall v Fulsang (2005) 258 DLR (4th) 425 (CA) [36].
(2005) 258 DLR (4th) 425 (CA) [36].
[2002] ABCA 122; (2002) 4 Alta LR (4 th) 51, [38].
[2010] EWHC 1541 (QB), [12].
See, e.g., ….
9

any such fixed reduction rule exists. The judge in Owens, Watkins J, did nothing to indicate
that he was doing anything other than making a decision solely for the purpose of the
proceedings before him. (Certainly, he did not offer remarks analogous to those made by
Lord Denning MR in Froom.) Some judges have denied that Owens sets the figure of 20% in
stone.63 A welter of relevant cases can be found in which a different discount was applied.64
Statutory fixed reduction rules exist in some jurisdictions. For example, in the Northern
Territory,65 South Australia,66 New Brunswick67 and Newfoundland68 legislation provides
that damages must be reduced by 25%69 for failing to wear a seat belt.70 In South Australia, if
the claimant is guilty of contributory negligence because he relied on an intoxicated
defendant, statute stipulates that damages must be cut back by 25%. This discount is
increased to 50% if the defendant was intoxicated to a sufficient degree.71 None of these
statutory fixed reduction rules gives the court the power not to apply the prescribed discount.
(b)

Minimum Reductions in Damages

The second type of fixed apportionment rules that will be addressed are minimum reduction
rules. Such rules require damages to be reduced by at least a specified percentage (such as
25%) where the claimant is guilty of contributory negligence. Whereas fixed reduction rules
result in damages being reduced in all cases that fall within a given category by a set amount
(and by no more and no less), minimum reductions rules demand that all cases that fall within
a given category have the award cut back by at least a prescribed figure. Greater reductions in
damages are permitted. Minimum reduction rules and fixed reduction rules are fundamentally
different from each other. Fixed reduction rules eliminate completely the discretion of the
trial judge, save for the discretion that the judge has as to the issue of whether the rule applies
in the first place. By contrast, minimum reduction rules merely eliminate certain discounts
from consideration (such as discounts of less than 25%). The judge is left free to reduce the
claimant’s damages by more than the prescribed minimum. Minimum reductions rules still
depart, of course, from the notion of discretionary apportionment. This is because, even if, in
the circumstances of the case, the court would, if it had the choice, apply a discount less than
the minimum prescribed percentage, the court is compelled to reduce damages by at least that
percentage.
Minimum reduction rules have long existed in Australia, although they only became
widespread at the start of the 21st Century. Today, all of Australia’s minimum reduction rules
are all concerned with intoxication cases.72 They provide that damages must be reduced by at

63
64

65
66
67
68
69

70

71
72

Stinton v Stinton [1993] PIQR P135 (QBD) 140; Currie v Clamp’s Executor 2002 SLT 196 (OH) [22].
See, e.g., Meah v McCreamer [1985] 1 All ER 367 (QBD) (25%); Stinton v Stinton [1993] PIQR P135
(QBD) (33.3%); Donelan v Donelan [1993] PIQR P205 (QBD) (75%) (however, it was said that ‘the fact of
this case [were] wholly exceptional’ (at 210)); Currie v Clamp’s Executor 2002 SLT 196 (OH) [22] (33.3%).
Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act (NT), s 11(1).
Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 49(3).
Insurance Act, RSNB 1973, c I-12, s 265.2(1).
Automobile Insurance Act, FSNL 1990, c A-22, s 28.1.
There is a fixed reduction of 15% for failing to wear a seat belt in Tasmania: Motor Accidents (Liabilities
and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas), s 22(4).
The Northern Territory and South Australian legislation extends to a failure to wear a safety helmet. The
legislation in South Australia applies also if the claimant travelled in a compartment of a vehicle other than a
passenger compartment.
Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 47(3) and (6).
The only exception is s 22 of the Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas), which
provides for a minimum reduction of 15% for failing to wear a seat belt.
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least 25% where the claimant is intoxicated73 or where he negligently ‘relied’ on an
intoxicated defendant.74 In some States, this minimum discount is increased to 50% where the
claimant’s contributory negligence is thought to be aggravated, such as where the claimant
was a driver,75 or where the person on whom the claimant relied was a driver.76 Minimum
reduction rules also exist in Canada. Legislation in New Brunswick,77 Newfoundland78 and
Nova Scotia79 provides that where the claimant fails to wear a seat belt and contributes to his
damage by some additional act of contributory negligence his damages shall be reduced by
not less than 25%.
(c)

Ceilings on Reductions in Damages

A maximum permitted reduction in damages is a ceiling on the size of the discount that a
court can apply for contributory negligence (for example, 25%). Ceilings are the inverse of
rules that provide for minimum reductions in damages. They depart from the concept of
discretionary apportionment because they restrict the discount for contributory negligence to
a given level even if the court would, but for the limit, have assigned a greater share of
responsibility for the damage to the claimant. It is arguable that there is a judicially created
ceiling in seat belt cases in at least some Canadian Provinces. In Snushall v Fulsang
Juriansz JA, speaking for the Ontario Court of Appeal, opined that a discount greater than
25% in seat belt cases would be ‘unreasonable’.80 In a striking departure from the ‘never say
never’ ethos that is generally embraced by judges, his Honour wrote:81 ‘In my view, there is
no reason to leave open the possibility that a greater apportionment might be appropriate in a
rare case.’82 In Vigoren v Nystuen Richards JA, with whom the other members of the Court of
Appeal of Saskatchewan agreed, said ‘the 25% figure should apply as a firm cap’.83
Legislatures in several jurisdictions in the United States have capped the maximum
discount in seat belt cases. For example, in Michigan, a court cannot reduce damages by more
than 5% in such cases.84 What about jurisdictions that embrace modified comparative
responsibility? As explained earlier,85 under modified comparative responsibility, as soon as
the discount reaches a particular threshold (usually 51%), the claimant’s action will fail
completely. Are such schemes illustrations of fixed apportionment rules? Such systems are
probably better understood as not involving fixed apportionment rules. Rather, under
modified comparative responsibility, apportionment is simply not available once the
claimant’s share of responsibility for the damage becomes sufficient large. Instead of
damages being apportioned, the claim is denied in toto for contributory negligence.

73

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

82
83
84

85

Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 50; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 47; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA),
s 46.
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 48(4); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 47(5).
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 47(5); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 46(4).
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 48–49; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 47.
Insurance Act, RSNB 1973, c I-12, s 265.2(2).
Automobile Insurance Act, RSNL 1990, c A-22, s 28.1(2).
Automobile Insurance Contract Mandatory Conditions Regulations, NS Reg 181/2003, s 10(1).
Snushall v Fulsang (2005) 258 DLR (4th) 425 (CA) [44].
‘Never say never’ is often an appropriate catchphrase for a judge to have in mind’: Al Rawi v Security
Service [2010] EWCA Civ 482, [69].
Snushall v Fulsang (2005) 258 DLR (4th) 425 (CA) [44].
[2006] SKCA 47, [102].
MCL 257.710e(6). A 5% ceiling applies also in Iowa (Iowa Code Ann, § 321.445(4)), Nebraska (Neb Rev
Stat, § 60–6,273) and Oregon (Or Rev Stat Ann, § 31.760). In Missouri, the ceiling is 1% (Mo Ann Stat,
§ 307.178(4)) while in Wisconsin it is 15% (Wisconsin Stat, § 347.48(2m)(g)).
See the text accompanying n 12.
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In Britain, despite some earlier doubts, it seems that the courts cannot reduce damages by
100% on account of the claimant’s contributory negligence.86 It might be thought that the rule
that damages can only be reduced for contributory negligence by less than 100% is a ceiling
(although the precise height of the ceiling is unclear (is it, for example, 95%, or 99%?)). The
better view, however, is that the reason why damages cannot be reduced by 100% is not
because there is a ceiling on the maximum discount but because the defence of contributory
negligence will not be engaged in the first place where a court would, if the rule applied, by
minded to reduce damages by 100%. A court that concludes that a 100% discount is
warranted is stating that the claimant is solely responsible for the damage about which the he
complains. But if the claimant is solely responsible for his damage, no tort will have been
committed, and if no tort is committed the question of contributory negligence will not even
arise for consideration.87 It follows that the principle that 100% discounts are not permitted is
not in fact a ceiling on the size of permissible discount, but a rule about the circumstances in
which the defence of contributory negligence applies.
(d)

Floor on Reductions in Damages

A floor on the permissible reduction in damages for contributory negligence would be a fixed
apportionment rule. An example of such a rule would be a rule that stipulated that damages
cannot be reduced by less than 5% for a given act of contributory negligence. Such a rule
would restrict in a modest way the discretion available to the courts to reduce damages. It
does not seem that there are any floors in Commonwealth jurisdictions. Reductions of less
than 10% are unusual, but not unheard of.88 However, because a floor is a type of fixed
apportionment rule it is mentioned for completeness.
(e)

Range of Permissible Discounts in Damages

A fifth type of fixed apportionment rule is a rule that restricts the courts to a discount that
falls between two percentages. For example, a legislature might enact a provision that states
that a given act of contributory negligence can attract discounts between 40% and 60% only.
Such a rule (which combines a ceiling with a floor) would obviously limit the courts’
discretion to determine the appropriate discount. Do rules that confine the courts to discounts
within a particular range exist any common law jurisdictions? Arguably, Canada recognises
such a rule in seat belt cases. In Galaske v O’Donnell Cory J remarked: ‘The courts in this
country have consistently deducted from 5 to 25 percent from claims for damages for
personal injury on the grounds that the victims were contributorily negligent for not wearing
seat belts.’89 It is not clear, however, whether there is any formal rule that restricts the courts’
discretion in this regard, or whether Cory J was merely observing that most discounts in seat
belt cases tend to fall within this range.
86

87

88

89

Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 (HL) 372, 387; Anderson v Newham
College of Further Education [2002] EWCA Civ 505; [2003] ICR 212; Buyukardicli v Hammerson UK
Properties plc [2002] EWCA Civ 683, [7].
‘[O]ne does not get to the question of contributory negligence until liability is established’: Sharpe v
Addison [2003] EWCA Civ 1189, [2007] Lloyd’s Rep PN 12, [32].
Consider Pasternack v Poulton [1973] 1 WLR 476 (QBD) 483 (5%); Pring v Hooper (unreported, NSWSC,
McInerney J, 10 March 1993) (1%); Snushall v Fulsang (2006) 258 DLR (4th) 425 (Ont CA) (5%); Nominal
Defendant v Rooskov [2012] NSWCA 43; (2012) 60 MVR 350 (5%). In Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953]
AC 663 (HL) 677 Lord Porter said that had he found the defendant liable, he would have attributed to the
defendant an ‘infinitesimal’ percentage of responsibility for the loss. It is not clear whether by this
Lord Porter would have discounted damages at all even if he had concluded that the defendant was liable.
[1994] 1 SCR 670 (SCC) 682.
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(f)

Summary

Although the apportionment provisions in all of the major common law jurisdictions adopt
discretionary apportionment, fixed apportionment rules have crept into the law in these
jurisdictions as a result of both judicial and statutory invention (although the Froom rules are
the only illustration of a judicially created fixed apportionment rule). At least three different
types of fixed apportionment rules exist: (1) rules that provide for fixed reductions in
damages (e.g., reduction by exactly 25%), (2) rules that require the courts to reduce damages
by a minimum amount (e.g. reduction of at least 25%), and (3) rules that place a ceiling on
the maximum discount (e.g., reduction of not more than 25%). Theoretically, additional types
of fixed apportionment rules could be created including (4) floors on the permissible
reductions in damages (e.g., reduction not less than 25%), and (5) provisions that restrict
discounts to a particular range (e.g., reduction greater than 25% and less than 50%). Some
fixed apportionment rules restrict the judge’s discretion to a much greater degree than others.
By far the most restrictive type of fixed apportionment rule is a fixed reduction in damages.
The only discretion that these rules leave to the trial judge is the discretion to decide whether
the fixed reduction rule applies in the first place.
5.

The Conflict between Discretionary Apportionment and Fixed Apportionment

Discretionary apportionment and fixed apportionment are incompatible approaches to
apportionment. Discretionary apportionment leaves the judge essentially free to determine the
discount that he thinks is appropriate given the unique circumstances of each case. By
contrast, fixed apportionment fixes the discount in some predetermined way. It is important
to note that, although the two approaches to apportionment may result in the same discount in
a given case, they can lead to different outcomes. Suppose that a claimant passenger is
injured in a car accident due to the negligence of the driver of the vehicle in whose car he was
travelling. The claimant was not wearing a seat belt. Had the claimant used a seat belt, he
would have escaped injury. In Britain, the claimant’s damages will, pursuant to Froom, be
reduced by 25%, unless the case is considered to be exceptional. 90 Now consider the same
scenario with the following modifications made to it. Suppose that the driver of the vehicle in
which the claimant was travelling was intoxicated (in circumstances where the claimant did
not know and could not reasonably have discovered this fact). Suppose also that the driver is
an adult whereas the passenger is a teenager. In the modified scenario, most people would
think, it is suggested, that the driver carries a significantly greater proportion of responsibility
for the claimant’s damage than in the original scenario. Yet, by virtue of Froom, damages
will still be reduced by 25% unless, again, the case is considered to be exceptional. Recall
that British courts are extremely reluctant to conclude that a case is exceptional.91
Conversely, were the issue of apportionment determined by a discretionary apportionment
rule, the damages would be discounted by a greater percentage in the original scenario than in
the modified scenario.
6.

Resolving the Conflict

It has been explained that the apportionment provisions in at least all of the major common
law jurisdictions are committed to discretionary apportionment.92 It has also been shown that
90
91
92

See the text above accompanying nn 50–53.
See the text accompanying nn 50–53.
See above Section 3.
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many fixed apportionment rules exist.93 All of the fixed apportionment rules are statutory in
nature, save for the Froom rules. Finally, it has been demonstrated that discretionary
apportionment and fixed apportionment are incompatible approaches to apportioning
damages.94 They can, as has been explained, yield different outcomes. We are dealing,
therefore, with a situation of inconsistent laws. How should this conflict be resolved? For
reasons that will be given in a moment, this question needs to be approached differently
depending on whether a given fixed apportionment rule is statute-based or developed by the
courts.
(a)

Statutory Fixed Apportionment Rules

Where a statute provides for a fixed apportionment rule, it is clear that the fixed
apportionment rule concerned must prevail over the discretionary apportionment rule laid
down by the apportionment legislation. This is for the simple reason that they will invariably
be more specific than the rule in the apportionment legislation: generalia specialibus non
derogant. Fixed apportionment rules are confined to particular contexts, such as motor
vehicle accidents or to particular acts of contributory negligence, such as being intoxicated.
Conversely, the apportionment provisions are, of course, extremely general. Although they
do not apply to proceedings for all torts,95 they do in principle apply to all factual situations
that might be presented by actions to which they extend. For example, in the context of the
action in negligence, the apportionment provisions apply to all conceivable types of negligent
and contributorily negligent behaviour. Unsurprisingly, when judges have considered
statutory fixed reduction rules they invariably simply apply them without even mentioning
the fact that they collide with the apportionment legislation.96
(b)

Common Law Fixed Apportionment Rules

The Froom rules are the only well-established judge-made fixed apportionment rules.
Because these rules fetter the discretion that the apportionment legislation gives to judges, it
is strongly arguably Froom (and many decisions that apply the Froom rules97) was decided
per incuriam.98 This, admittedly, is a radical suggestion. However, this conclusion follows
inexorably from the fact that fixed apportionment rules are inconsistent with the discretionary
approach to apportionment laid down by the apportionment legislation. It might be replied
that Froom is compatible with the apportionment legislation on the ground that
93
94
95

96
97
98

See above Section 4.
See above Section 5.
In Britain, for example, the apportionment legislation does not apply to proceedings in trespass to the person
(Co-Operative Group (CWS) Ltd v Pritchard [2011] EWCA Civ 329; [2011] 3 WLR 1272), trespass to
goods or conversion (Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, s 11(1) or deceit (Standard Chartered Bank
v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (Nos 2 and 4) [2002] UKHL 43; [2003] 1 AC 959).
See, e.g., Robbins v Skouboudis [2013] QSC 101, [52]; Hawira v Connolly [2008] QSC 4, [53].
See above Section 4(a)(i).
John Spencer seemed to hint at this in a note in Froom. Referring to ‘the way in which the Court of Appeal
tried to prescribed in advance the percentage by which a plaintiff’s damage should be reduced’, Spencer
wrote ‘As the apportionment of damages for contributory negligence is usually treated as a matter for the
discretion of the court in question, it is possible to raise academic objections to this’: Spencer (n 31) 45.
Robert Stevens is explicit. He contends that the fixed reduction rules laid down in Froom ‘flagrantly ignor[e]
the statutory language’: R Stevens, ‘Should Contributory Fault be Analogue or Digital?’ in A Dyson,
J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Tort (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014) (forthcoming).
Cf Stanton v Collinson [2010] EWCA Civ 81; [2010] RTR 26, [26] where Hughes LJ, speaking for the
Court of Appeal, contended that the fact that the apportionment legislation gives great discretion to judges
‘permits an approach such as adopted in Froom v Butcher.’
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Lord Denning MR in that case was merely endeavouring to interpret the words ‘just and
equitable’ in the apportionment legislation.99 His Lordship was not, on this way of looking at
things, creating new rules that clashed with that legislation. So understood, Lord Denning
MR did not exceed his judicial function but, rather, simply sought to discern what Parliament
meant by the words ‘just and equitable’. To put this counterpoint in the factual context in
Froom, the Froom rules do nothing more than explain what a ‘just and equitable’ reduction in
damages is in seat belt cases.
It is difficult, however, to characterise plausibly what Lord Denning MR did in Froom was
an exercise in statutory interpretation. Compare, in this regard, the cases that tell us that it is
relevant to consider the relative blameworthiness of the parties and the causal potency of their
acts in asking what a ‘just and equitable’ allocation of responsibility is. 100 It can plausibly be
argued that the identification of these twin factors as relevant to the determination of the
amount by which damages ought to be reduced for contributory negligence where no fixed
apportionment rule applies are simply attempts to interpret the words ‘just and equitable’, and
that the identification of these factors as relevant to apportionment is not an instance of
judicial legislation. The laying down of the Froom rules is a fundamentally different exercise
from the identification of these twin factors. Consider what Lord Denning MR said in Froom
in an attempt to justify his decision to lay down the 15% and 25% fixed reduction rules in
that case. His Lordship wrote: ‘Suffice it to assess a share of responsibility which will be just
and equitable in the great majority of cases.’101 These words are revealing since they
recognise that there will be some cases in which the reduction in damages yielded by the
Froom rules will not be just and equitable. In this passage Lord Denning MR essentially
acknowledged, therefore, that the rules that he established were incompatible with the
legislation. The correct conclusion, therefore, is indeed that Froom was decided per incuriam.
7.

Advantages and Disadvantages

Nothing that has been said so far addresses directly the respective merits and demerits of
fixed apportionment. It is to this issue that attention will now be turned. What are their
advantages and disadvantages?102
(a)

The Case for Discretionary Apportionment

A case in favour of discretionary apportionment was made in what has become known as the
Ipp Report,103 which is an important Australian report that advised the governments of
Australia how the tort system should be changed so as to address a perceived ‘insurance
crisis’.104 The authors of this report said:105
99
100
101
102

103
104

I am grateful to Andrew Burrows for suggesting this counterargument to me.
See the text accompanying nn 11, 28–30.
[1976] QB 286 (CA) 296.
I have derived much assistance in formulating the analysis in this section from discussions of the use of
discretion in sentencing in the criminal law and in the law of evidence. I have found particularly insightful
the treatments in Colin Tapper, ‘The Law of Evidence and the Rule of Law’ (2009) CLJ 67 and Andrew
Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 4th ed (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005) 30–31,
41–42, 51–54, 72–74.
Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (2002).
Peter Cane was one of the authors of the Ipp Report. For his thoughts on the report, see Peter Cane,
‘Reforming Tort Law in Australia: A Personal Perspective’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review
649. The report is also discussed in James Goudkamp, ‘The Young Report: An Australian Perspective on the
Latest Response to Britain’s “Compensation Culture”’ (2012) 28 Journal of Professional Negligence 4. The
Australian legislatures were unpersuaded by the Panel’s recommendations in this connection, and enacted
fixed apportionment rules: see the text accompanying nn 66, 71, 73–76.
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[C]ontributory negligence come[s] in an infinite variety of forms. From one case to another, the
respective culpability of the plaintiff and defendant, and their relative causal contributions to
the death or injury may differ widely. It is impossible to fix a minimum, just and equitable
apportionment of responsibility to the plaintiff applicable to cases where the plaintiff’s
contributory negligence involves a certain type of behaviour. In the opinion of the Panel, any
such reduction would be arbitrary and unprincipled, and could work injustice in some cases.
The Panel considers that any fettering of judicial discretion to apportion damages for
contributory negligence is undesirable.

Two arguments in favour of discretionary apportionment are ravelled together in this passage,
and it is important to separate them. The first argument is that discretionary apportionment
rules are superior to fixed apportionment rules because the latter rules are arbitrary while the
former are more principled. The authors of the Ipp Report were obviously correct to note that
the size of discounts mandated by fixed apportionment rules are arbitrarily determined. A rule
that requires, for example, damages to be reduced by 25% for a given act of contributory
negligence is no more and no less defensible than a rule that imposes a discount of half or
double that amount.106 But discretionary apportionment rules are vulnerable to precisely the
same criticism. Apportionments yielded by a system of discretionary apportionment are no
less arbitrary than those produced by a fixed apportionment rule. Degrees of contributory
negligence simply cannot be measured in the same way that, for example, distance, weight or
height can be measured. It has often been pointed out that the decision to select a particular
discount instead of another discount is an arbitrary one. For example, Dean Prosser wrote:
‘Obviously any estimate that 40 per cent of the total fault rests with the pedestrian who walks
out into the street in the path of an automobile, and 60 per cent with the driver who is not
looking and runs him down, represents nothing resembling accuracy based on demonstrable
fact.’107 Similarly, Richard Epstein observed: ‘there is nothing about the particular pattern of
factual information, even if perfectly known, that demands any unique set of percentages in
any given case. All allocation of responsibility between the two parties is arbitrary…’.108 The
first argument offered by the authors of the Ipp Report in favour of discretionary
apportionment is, for these reasons, unconvincing.
The second argument, at which the authors of the Ipp Report only hint, is based on the fact
that the number of combinations of factual circumstances that can be relevant to the
determination of the respective shares of responsibility are infinite and infinitely various. If a
fixed apportionment rule is laid down, there is a danger that dissimilar cases will be treated in
the same way, and that similar cases will be handled differently. For example, if a statute
provides that damages must always be reduced by 25% whenever the claimant is guilty of
contributory negligence on account of his intoxication, the same discount might be applied to
both voluntarily and involuntarily intoxicated claimants, to both slightly and grossly
intoxicated claimants, to both teenage and adult defendants and so on. Similarly, if a statute
stipulates that such a discount must be applied whenever a claimant motorist is guilty of
contributory negligence in driving in excess of the speed limit, the same discount will be
105
106

107
108

Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (2002) 126 [8.16].
As Richards JA observed in Vigoren v Nystuen [2006] SKCA 47, [98]: ‘There is no precise and selfevidently correct amount by which the plaintiff’s claim should be reduced. Lord Denning [in Froom v
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applied irrespective of whether a given claimant was driving 5 mph or 50 mph above that
limit and regardless of the prevailing driving conditions. Intuition suggests that the variations
in these two scenarios are morally important and that the law would be unjust were it not
sensitive to them.
(b)

The Case for Fixed Apportionment

What is the case in favour of fixed apportionment rules? One thing that fixed apportionment
rules have going in their favour is that they make the outcome of litigation more certain,
especially if they are rarely departed from, as is the case, for example, with the Froom
rules.109 Thus, in the United Kingdom, a claimant who is guilty of contributory negligence on
account of failing to wear a seat belt can usually calculate with a high degree of certainty the
percentage by which his damages will be discounted on account of contributory negligence.
All other things being equal, the more predictable the outcome of litigation the more likely it
is that litigants will settle their dispute.110
A second advantage of fixed apportionment rules is that they help to keep the cost of
litigation in proportion to the value of the underlying claim. A rule that, for example,
stipulates that damage must be reduced by 25% on account of a given act of contributory
negligence leaves much less room for evidence to be called and for submissions to be made
in relation to the issue of apportionment than a rule that states, as the apportionment
legislation does, that damages should be reduced to such extent as is ‘just and equitable’.
Under the imagined former rule, the only evidence that would be admissible is that which
casts light on whether the claimant committed the act of contributory negligence that triggers
the rule. Conversely, under the latter rule, a vastly wider range of evidence would be prima
facie admissible. Indeed, any evidence that concerns the relative blameworthiness of the
parties and the causal potency of their acts would be relevant. Lord Denning MR was mindful
of this factor in Froom. He wrote: ‘Th[e] question [of apportionment] should not be
prolonged by an expensive inquiry into the degree of blameworthiness on either side, which
would be hotly disputed.’111 Few would dissent, it is suggested, from the proposition that the
cost of litigation should be at least roughly proportionate to the value of what is at stake.112
Quelling disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the value of the case is part of the
‘overriding objective’ of the Civil Procedure Rules.113
Thirdly, fixed apportionment rules promote consistency in the way that cases are decided.
There is a great danger under a system of discretionary apportionment that similar cases will
be treated differently and that different cases will be handled in a like manner. The danger of
disparate outcomes is particular acute given that the vast majority of cases in which
apportionment is in issue are decided in County Courts114 (and in institutionally equivalent
courts in the case of other jurisdictions). This is because the decisions of those Courts are not
publically available and so opportunities for judges to refer to each other’s decisions on
109
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apportionment which a view to achieving a degree of consistency are extremely limited. The
difficulty with this situation is compounded by an apparent lack of appellate oversight of
decisions on apportionment. As mentioned earlier,115 it is a well-established principle that
appellate scrutiny of decisions regarding apportionment will be made available only rarely.
Appellate courts will intervene only exceptionally where it is clear that the first-instance
decision is flawed. The lack of appellate control means that it is virtually certain that there
will be significant diversity in the way in which the issue of apportionment is decided at firstinstance. Even if such diversity does not exist, the risk that it will develop is substantial.
Fourthly, and most fundamentally, fixed apportionment rules promote the rule of law. In
an ideal world, every conceivable situation would be catered for by a rule that is settled ex
ante. The development of a precise set of rules by which we are to be governed has long been
recognised as one aspect of the rule of law.116 Of course, because of ignorance about the way
in which the world works, and the lack of precision in our language, it is impossible to
comply perfectly with this goal. The use of discretion by judges to deal with disputes the
resolution of which cannot be provided for justly in advance is, therefore, inevitable. But it is
very doubtful that the current state of affairs in relation to apportionment for contributory
negligence is as close to the ideal as can be achieved. Although many fixed apportionment
rules exist throughout the common law world, relatively few fixed-apportionment rules exist
within a single jurisdiction. In the United Kingdom, for example, the only fixed
apportionment rules are those established by Froom. Most jurisdictions are fully under the
spell of the apportionment provision which, as has been explained, imposes an apportionment
regime that is about as close to a purely discretionary system as is possible to achieve.117
8.

Reform Recommendations

It was argued in the previous section that, while it is necessary to confer judges with some
discretion in the context of apportionment, the current system goes much too far in the
direction of discretionary apportionment. More fixed apportionment rules should be
introduced. Introducing such rules would promote certainty in the law, reduce the cost of
litigation, tend to ensure consistency in outcomes (in circumstances where there is a great risk
of inconsistency) and bring this area of law into increased compliance with the rule of law.
How, precisely, should the law be shifted in the direction of fixed apportionment?
(a)

A Structured Discretion?

One option would be to amend the apportionment legislation so that the discretion that it
affords to judges is more structured. The legislation in all major common law jurisdictions
currently permits judges to consider or to exclude from consideration almost any facts or
factors that they wish.118 The legislation could be changed so that it requires judges to
consider facts or factors that are thought to be relevant.119 Such facts or factors might include,
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for instance, the respective ages of the parties, the ease with which the parties could have
avoided or reduced the risk of damage that materialised, the gravity and magnitude of the risk
that the parties’ respective conduct created or increased, whether the parties were subjectively
aware of the risk in question and whether a given discount would tend to promote the goals of
deterrence or punishment (should those goal be considered relevant). These facts and factors
are merely meant, it is stressed, to illustrate considerations that might be incorporated within
the apportionment legislation to lend some structure to the discretion that it affords judges.
(b)

Fixed Reduction Rules?

Amending the apportionment legislation so that the discretion that it affords judges is more
structured would be a very modest reform. It would merely nudge the law in the direction of
fixed apportionment. Were it adopted, judges would retain very significant freedom to
determine the amount by which damages should be reduced for contributory negligence, and
provided that they touch upon factors that are relevant to the case at hand, their decisions
would be effectively insulated from appellate interference. So, while implementing this
proposed changed might improve the present situation, the improvement would be slight. The
system would remain an essentially discretionary one lacking appellate oversight. Therefore,
the problems with discretionary apportionment that have been canvassed would not really be
addressed. There are any number of other changes that could be made to the apportionment
legislation that would result in the law travelling much farther down to the road to fixed
apportionment. This is clear from the great diversity of fixed apportionment rules that were
discussed earlier.120 The type of fixed apportionment rule that minimises the input from the
judiciary to the greatest extent are rules that provide for fixed reductions in damages,121 such
as the Froom rules. While the Froom rules leave judges with discretion as to whether to apply
the Froom rules,122 once a judge has decided that the Froom rules apply, he has no discretion
as to the discount to apply. Because rules that provide for fixed reductions in damages reduce
judicial discretion by a much greater amount than the other types of fixed apportionment
rules, they are prima facie superior to the other types of fixed apportionment rules,123 at least
if the arguments in favour of fixed apportionment that have been set out above are
compelling. Thus, the proposal that is being made is that the law on apportionment would be
brought into a more satisfactory state were more fixed reduction rules created.
(c)

When would it be Justifiable to Introduce Fixed Reduction Rules?

Of course, there are limits to the circumstances in which introducing fixed reduction rules
would be justified. In order for a fixed reduction rule to be justified, it would seem that at
least four conditions would need to be satisfied. These conditions are as follows: (1) the rule
must apply to a group of cases in which there is little relevant factual diversity; (2) cases that
fall within the specified group would need to occur sufficiently frequently to make adopting
the rule in question worthwhile; (3) it must be possible to define a given category of case
reasonably clearly; and (4) as with the Froom rules, judges should be permitted to depart
from the fixed reduction rule in exceptional circumstances. A few words need to be said
about each of these conditions. Condition (1) refers to the need to isolate sets of cases that are
relatively homogenous in terms of the facts that are thought to be relevant to the issue of
apportionment. Lord Denning MR isolated such a set of cases – seat belt cases – in Froom.
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Generally speaking, most seat belt cases present no issues relevant to the apportionment of
damages except those of whether the claimant failed to use a seat belt and whether that failure
made a difference in terms of the damage suffered. It would not make sense for one seeking
to establish more fixed apportionment rules to define a set of cases that drags within its net
cases that vary wildly in terms of their salient characteristics. For example, an inappropriate
category of case to which to apply a fixed reduction rule would be a category in which the
claimant was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to follow the defendant’s
instructions. There would be little homogeneity to such a category. Cases that fall within it
might be thought to require very different treatment depending on, for example, how
persistently or brazenly the claimant had failed to follow instructions, the clarity of the
instructions and the force with which the need to comply to them was impressed upon the
claimant, whether the defendant was a professional who was advising the claimant, and the
vulnerability of the claimant. What is meant by condition (2), and its importance, is selfevident. There is no utility in developing a fixed reduction rule for a group of cases if cases
fall within that group only once in a blue moon. The significance of condition (3) is also
axiomatic. If a given category is not defined with sufficient precision, frequent arguments
will inevitably break out as to whether a given case falls within it. This will undermine the
goal of promoting certainty, which is one of the reasons that has been offered for introducing
fixed reduction rules.124 Condition (4) recognises the limitations of human foresight. No
matter how carefully a given category of case to which a fixed reduction rule is to be applied
is defined, there are bound to be cases which are thought to be sufficiently different from
most of the other cases that fall within the category such that they warrant separate treatment.
Hence, it would be desirable for judges to enjoy an exclusionary discretion, as they do in the
case of the Froom rules,125 so that atypical cases can be insulated from the fixed reduction
rule. Such a discretion should be exercised sparingly or else the purpose of creating the fixed
reduction rule would be defeated.
(d) To Which Categories of Case should Fixed Reduction Rules be Applied?
One question that the foregoing discussion presents is what categories of case should be
isolated and subjected to fixed reduction rules, bearing in mind the constraints mentioned
under the previous heading? To an extent, it is possible to leave this question to one side for
present purposes on the ground that it is subsidiary one. It should first be decided whether the
proposal that has been advanced, namely, that more fixed reduction rules should be
welcomed into tort law, is one that should be adopted in principle before categories of case to
which such rules should apply are identified. However, simply by way of suggestion, some
possible categories of case to which fixed reduction rules might sensibly be applied include
cases in which the claimant drove while voluntarily intoxicated or travelled with an driver
whom he knew or ought to have known was intoxicated, crossed a road without looking for
incoming traffic, failed to use a designated and conveniently available pedestrian crossing,
and failed to wear protective clothing. These are, it is emphasised, merely suggestions of
categories of cases that might be relevant. The idea is to put them forward merely so that it
can be debated whether they ought to be governed by a fixed reduction rule.
(e) What Discount should be Applied?
What discounts should be yielded by any fixed reduction rules that are introduced? This is an
easier question to answer than might initially appear to be. Recall that the decision to reduce
124
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damages by a particular amount for contributory negligence is an arbitrary one.126 A decision
to reduce damages by, for example, 25%, in cases in which the claimant accepts a ride from
an intoxicated driver is neither more nor less justifiable than a decision to reduce damages in
such a case by 10% or 50%. Accordingly, subject to what follows, any discount that is
selected is neither more nor less justifiably than any other discount. Nevertheless, there are a
few considerations that should guide the decision-making process. First, it would not make
sense to settle upon very small discounts, such as 1%, or very large discounts, such as 99%.
A rule that prescribed such discounts would, as Glanville Williams pointed out, be a
‘needless technicality’.127 The claim might as well be allowed to succeed in full or be denied
altogether. Secondly, there should be some proportionality between the various discounts laid
down by fixed reduction rules. It would not be just, for example, to reduce damages by just
10% for driving while intoxicated and to reduce damages by 90% for accepting a lift from an
intoxicated driver. Thirdly, minute differences between different discounts should be
tolerated. It would be artificial to select, for instance, a discount of 40% for one act of
contributory negligence and 41% for another act. Such differences suggest that the selection
of the discount is a mathematical exercise, which it is not. This explains, incidentally, why
judges tend to reduce damages for contributory negligence in a fairly large increments.
Discounts are usually in multiples of 10 or 5 rather than smaller units. These three
considerations which it is suggested should be borne in mind in determining the quantum of
discounts imposed by fixed reduction rules are not, of course, intended to be exhaustive.
(f) Should Fixed Reduction Rules be Introduced by the Courts or the Legislature?
Finally, should more fixed reduction rules be introduced by legislation or by the courts? The
answer to this question is straightforward. For the reasons given earlier,128 the apportionment
legislation in all of the major common law jurisdictions is committed to an extreme
discretionary system of apportionment. Rules that limit the discretion that is conferred by the
legislation are therefore inconsistent with it129 and judges are not free, therefore, to lay down
fixed apportionment rules. It is for this reason that Froom, as argued above, was decided per
incuriam.130 Surprisingly, Froom does not seem to have been challenged on this ground.131
However, it is obviously inappropriate for the courts to disregard legislation. Any fixed
reduction rules that are introduced should be introduced by statute, and the Froom rules
should be put on a statutory footing.132
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9.

Objections to the Reform Recommendations

It was recommended in the previous section that the law on the apportionment of damages for
contributory negligence would be improved by retreating from discretionary apportionment
and moving in the direction of fixed apportionment, specifically, by embracing more fixed
reduction rules. This section considers some objections that might be raised against this
prescription. One objection that might be made is that if more fixed apportionment rules were
introduced, at least if they were statutory in nature (which it has been argued they should
be133), they would undermine the independence of the judiciary. This objection is frequently
raised against removing judges’ discretion in the context of sentencing. However, this
complaint (which is very different from a complaint that it would be undesirable to restrict
judges’ discretion) is unjustified, in both the sentencing context and the present setting.134
Parliament very frequently lays down rules that leave relatively little scope for judicial
discretion, in tort law and beyond, and this does nothing to offend the independence of the
judiciary. The principle of judicial independence demands that Parliament should not exert
inappropriate control over the judiciary, such as by removing judges whose decisions are
politically unpopular from office or reducing their remuneration. Fixed apportionment rules
obviously do not raise that spectre.
Secondly, it might be argued that the advantages of fixed apportionment rules could to
some extent be obtained other than by adopting fixed apportionment rules. For example, one
way in the way in which the law on apportionment of damages for contributory negligence
could be rendered more certain and consistent in its application without departing from the
paradigm of discretionary apportionment would be to make more decisions on apportionment
publically available. As explained above,135 the way in which judges apportion damages is
extremely opaque because there is no convenient way to access decisions of courts that sit
lower in the judicial hierarchy than the High Court in the case of England and Wales (and
courts in other jurisdictions similarly situated in the judicial hierarchy). A second way in
which greater certainty and consistency could be brought to this area of the law other than by
embracing fixed apportionment rules is by publishing guidelines similar to, for example, the
guidelines issued by the Judicial College in relation to the award of general damages in
personal injury cases.136 It is certainly true that implementing these alternatives would clearly
go some way towards improving the present situation. However, in order for this objection to
hit home, it would be necessary to establish (1) that these alternatives (individually or in
combination) would yield a more satisfactory state of affairs than embracing more fixed
apportionment rules and; (2) that embracing fixed apportionment rules in addition to these
alternatives would bring no or only a marginal additional net gain. This would be a tall order.
Thirdly, it might be objected that the analysis complains about inconsistency (or a threat of
inconsistency) in apportionment cases but without adducing any evidence of inconsistency. It
is true that this article has not demonstrated that there are statistically significant differences
in the way in which similar cases are treated in so far as apportionment for contributory
negligence is concerned. However, several points should be kept in mind in this regard. First,
it is not the purpose of this article to ascertain whether such differences exist. The main goals
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of this article are to introduce the concepts of fixed apportionment and discretionary
apportionment, to examine the extent to which the major common law jurisdictions have
embraced these concepts, and to consider the arguments based in theory for and against
discretionary apportionment and fixed apportionment. Secondly, the objection would not
answer the point that the current system presents an unacceptable risk that apportionment
cases will be decided inconsistently. Even if there is no inconsistency, the lack of
transparency in relation to decisions regarding apportionment in the County Courts (and
equivalent courts in other jurisdictions) coupled with the lack of appellate oversight presents
a serious risk that inconsistency will creep into this area of the law even if it does not already
exist. Thirdly, inconsistency (or the risk of inconsistency) is only one of several grounds that
have been offered for limiting judicial discretion in apportionment cases. So even if this
consideration is thought to be unconvincing that would not show that the other arguments are
unpersuasive.
10.

Wider Implications: the Law of Contribution

What implications does the analysis in this article have for the law of torts generally? One
part of tort law that needs to be kept in mind in this regard is the law of contribution. In most
common law jurisdictions, legislation has modified the common law rule that where one
concurrent tortfeasor satisfies the claimant’s judgment in full he cannot recover contribution
or obtain an indemnity from any other tortfeasor.137 Leaving aside the details, which are
unimportant for present purposes, the legislation permits a wrongdoer to recover contribution
from any other person who is liable for the same damage. The quantum of contribution is to
be ‘such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of
[the] responsibility [of the person from whom contribution is sought] for the damage in
question.’138 This language, which confers judges with significant discretion, bears a striking
similarity to that used in many apportionment statutes. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
Froom rules have been applied in cases in which a negligent motorist sought contribution
from a parent who negligently failed to secure their infant child with an approved child safety
restraint.139 This article has not addressed contribution. However, because the rules that
govern the apportionment of damages for contributory negligence and contribution are so
similar, the argument that has been offered in relation to contributory negligence would seem
to apply also to contribution. The goal, therefore, if the analysis that has been offered in
relation to contributory negligence is correct, should be to develop rules that limit judicial
discretion in the contribution context too. Exactly how this might be achieved is something
that cannot be conveniently addressed in this article.
11.

Conclusion

The main argument advanced in this article is that the apportionment legislation is slanted
much too far in the direction of discretionary apportionment. The law regarding contributory
negligence would be considerably improved if more fixed apportionment rules were
introduced. Because the apportionment legislation is fundamentally committed to an extreme
system of discretionary apportionment, it follows that the landmark case of Froom was
decided per incuriam in so far as that decision created (or, it might be better to say, sought to
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create) fixed apportionment rules. However, on the analysis that has been presented here,
Lord Denning MR, although he acted in defiance of the apportionment legislation, was right
to be attracted to a more fixed system of apportionment.
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